Leaked SSL Intermediate Certificates: https connections cannot be trusted

[u/moanos]

curl https://q3k.google.com --resolve 'q3k.google.com:443:135.181.235.221'
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<b>oh, this is bad</b>
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Yeah, eight SSL Intermediate Certificates of eMudhra have been publicly leaked. All your servers https traffic can be broken right now. Browsers are fine as they have revoked the certificates but as you can see, curl and many other libraries still accept those.

No download can be trusted right now. Remember to not only patch your main systems but every docker container you run.

This is bad 😅

[u/_shulhan]

I am not sure what the "popular libraries" means. Did you mean any unofficial libraries? Or official library from the language itself?

In Go, they patch the compiler by rejecting the offending certificates during handshake, not by updating some files: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/851165

And AFAIK, Go also does not store their own CA but read it from OS files or from syscall:

https://go.googlesource.com/go/+/refs/heads/master/src/crypto/x509/

[u/ace_gravity → u/_shulhan]

Node has its own cert store and doesn't use system ca by default. Python has certifi package that is used by the popular requests library. (This is why the azure cli doesn't use the system ca by default) Rust has the popular webpki-roots package. I'm less familiar with Go, was extrapolating based on the issue

[u/ghjm → u/ace_gravity]

We're about to discover what a pain in the ass the language repo model for CA distribution is. For the distro you can just do an apt upgrade or dnf update and everything's fixed. For certifi (and similar) you have to track down every container and every venv and update all of them individually.

There will be old Python apps that still trust the compromised CAs for years. It's functionally almost impossible to find all of them.

[u/yrro → u/ghjm]

It's certainly part of the ecosystem that I wish was done by a single system daemon, accessible by unix socket. Offload all trust decisions etc. to the daemon, which has a single consistent set of trust roots, can handle OCSP, CRL fetching, etc...