Bank of America missed or delayed reporting more than $5 BILLION in suspicious activity.
Its anti-money-laundering penalty? $1.2 billion.
Tell me again why Bitcoin is the problem.
But the most revealing number isn’t either of those.
It’s 750.
That’s how many additional personnel the bank estimated it would need to handle investigations after changing its monitoring thresholds.
The bank had customer identities. Transaction records. Monitoring software.
Yet collecting information didn’t guarantee anyone would act on it.
To be clear: suspicious activity isn’t proven money laundering. And banking failures don’t erase Bitcoin’s risks.
But they demolish one comfortable assumption:
“Regulated” doesn’t automatically mean “effectively supervised.”
Before demanding more visibility into everyone’s money, shouldn’t institutions demonstrate that they can act on what they already know?
Your identity can be verified. Your transactions can be monitored. Your account can be controlled.
None of that guarantees accountability.